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Resumo 
As aplicações de partilha de localização (location-sharing) prometem modificar, de uma 
forma radical e num futuro bastante próximo, a forma como as pessoas interagem e 
socializam, estabelecendo a ponte entre as redes sociais e o mundo real. No entanto, as 
preocupações, legítimas e generalizadas, relativas às implicações de privacidade 
associadas a esta classe de aplicações, sugerem que a sua adopção por parte da 
comunidade dependerá sempre da medida em que essas preocupações sejam 
resolvidas. Uma dificuldade adicional consiste no facto de os utilizadores deste tipo de 
aplicações têm dificuldade em antecipar a forma de utilizar o serviço, e em definir 
filtros (políticas de privacidade) que traduzam essas mesmas preocupações. 
Vários grupos de investigação têm analisado as necessidades e comportamentos desses 
utilizadores, com o objectivo de identificar um conjunto de mecanismos que resolva 
efectivamente essas necessidades. Até à data, ainda não existem publicações que 
explorem a dimensão temporal nas análises efectuadas. Assim sendo, este projecto visa 
compreender o comportamento ao longo do tempo de utilizadores do Locaccino, uma 
aplicação de partilha de localização desenvolvida e concretizada pelo Mobile Commerce 
Lab. Mais especificamente, o projecto visa identificar elementos-chave que não são 
revelados sem ter em consideração a dimensão temporal e a ordenação dos eventos, 
aproveitando o facto de o Locaccino permitir estudos de longa duração. 
Foram analisados os comportamentos e preferências de privacidade de 289 utilizadores 
do Locaccino, divididos por 2 estudos. Os resultados revelam que os utilizadores, ao 
modificar as suas preferências de privacidade (filtros), evoluem tipicamente para 
políticas menos restritivas, partilhando mais localizações. Os mesmos utilizadores 
evoluem simultaneamente para preferências de privacidade tipicamente mais 
complexas, o que sugere a existência de um processo de aprendizagem (mensurável) ao 
longo do tempo. Foi ainda analisada de mecanismos que de transparência (feedback) 
que permitem aos utilizadores saber informação sobre quem tenta obter as suas 
localizações. Os resultados revelam a importância dos mecanismos de transparência 
(feedback) para ajudar os utilizadores na construção das suas políticas de privacidade. 
Esta importância é mais visível nos utilizadores com terminais móveis.  
A integração destes resultados no desenvolvimento de aplicações de partilha de 
localização resultará seguramente numa maior eficácia das políticas de privacidade 
definidas pelos utilizadores, aumentando assim o seu conforto relativamente às 
questões de privacidade. 
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Abstract 
Location-sharing applications in social networking may radically transform the way 
people interact and socialize with each other, by providing the bridge between social 
networking and the actual social interaction. People already expressed legitimate 
concerns about the privacy implications associated with this class of applications, 
suggesting that a broad adoption may only happen to the extent that these concerns 
are adequately addressed. Additionally, users still cannot anticipate how the location-
sharing service is going to be used, or how to express the privacy policies that most 
suite their needs. 
A significant research effort has already been put in the analysis of user’s needs, for 
building user-controllable systems that adequately protect the disclosure of their 
locations. However, no published work has yet explored the temporal dimension in 
such analyses. This project aims at studying people’s attitudes and behaviors towards 
privacy using Locaccino, a location-sharing application developed and deployed by the 
Mobile Commerce Lab. More specifically, it aims at identifying key elements that are 
only revealed with a dynamic analysis of usage data that takes into consideration the 
temporal dimension and the ordering of events, based on the fact that Locaccino allows 
long-last studies.  
We analyzed the privacy preferences and behavior of 289 Locaccino users, in two 
distinct studies. Our results demonstrate that users, when modifying their policies, 
typically evolve to less restrictive, sharing more locations. They also evolve to more 
complex privacy policies, suggesting an increasing awareness of the implications of their 
decisions over time. We investigated the importance of mechanisms that provide users 
with awareness of who tried to locate them (feedback mechanisms). The results reveal 
the importance of feedback mechanisms for helping users defining their privacy 
policies, which is particularly relevant for those using mobile platforms. 
We believe that the integration of these findings in the design of location-sharing 
applications can significantly contribute to enhance the effectiveness of user’s privacy 
policies. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1. Location technology 
The most commonly used location mechanisms are Wi-Fi positioning, cellular 
identification and Global Positioning System (GPS). Any of these mechanisms have 
enough accuracy for the location-sharing requirements. 
Wi-Fi localization mechanism consists in assigning users with the location of Wi-Fi access 
points. While Wi-Fi public access points provide limited coverage, the increasing 
adoption of personal wireless devices has severely increased the global coverage in 
urban areas (even indoors). Researchers and companies such as Skyhook Wireless [1] 
have created large databases with considerable granularity, to be used with this location 
mechanism. 
Cellular identification is based on measuring power levels and antenna patterns. It relies 
on the assumption that a mobile phone always communicates wirelessly with one of the 
closest base stations. The accuracy of this technology depends on the concentration of 
base stations, ranging from 50 meters in urban areas up to miles in rural areas. Some 
companies interested in the location-sharing market are partnering with telecom 
companies in order to use cellular data with location purposes. 
GPS locates a person through a device (held by the person) that is in communication 
with a constellation of satellites. Its accuracy reaches the magnitude of few meters, 
depending of factors like the receiving antenna and the morphology of the terrain. 
Despite being the most accurate location mechanism, it requires line-of-sight (outdoor 
environments) and can be battery intensive. 
The applicability of these location mechanisms depend mostly on the coverage, 
accuracy and power consumption.  
Location mechanism Accuracy Coverage Indoors Battery consumption 
Wi-Fi High (DB dependent) Urban areas Yes Regular 
Cellular Low (BTS dependent) Mobile telephony's Yes Low 
GPS Highest Worldwide No Intensive 
Table 1 – Location mechanism’s characterization 
While laptops are currently equipped with Wi-Fi, smartphones are increasingly being 
equipped with all the three location mechanisms, which tend to be considered a “must 
have” feature [2]. Whenever more than one location mechanism is available in a given 
device, the one preferred is usually the one that ensures enough coverage, maximizes 
the accuracy while minimizing the power consumption. In section 3.3.2, we describe the 
specific location technologies implemented in our location-sharing application, 
Locaccino. 
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1.2. Privacy and security concerns 
The ubiquity of location information raises both benefits and privacy concerns for 
location-based applications [3], since locations become more invaluable. Security 
concerns also arise if perpetrators are able to gain access to location information about 
their victims, e.g., increasing the risk of stalking and domestic violence. 
Compared to general location-aware applications, location-sharing applications have an 
added value in selectively sharing one’s location. For example, in a location-aware social 
network this can be a social benefit like meeting a nearby friend. A distinct example of 
application is parental control, where the disclosure of a child’s location allows attesting 
the child’s safety. In fact, parental control is an application where the need for selective 
disclosure is evident for ensuring both privacy and security. 
People’s concerns with location privacy may depend on the place, not only in terms of 
their physical location but also in terms of their social context: their personal definition 
of where they are, what they are doing, and with whom [4]. Moreover, people that tend 
to be more concerned about privacy in general are the ones that most vary their 
willingness to share location information. 
A recent study [5] revealed that most Internet users have concerns about sharing their 
location information online, are extremely concerned about controlling who has access 
to their locations and feel the risks of using location-sharing technologies outweigh the 
benefits. They also feel that the most likely harms would stem from revealing the 
location of their home to others or being stalked. 
One additional concern is the fact that location information is highly identifiable, even 
when anonymized [6]. Most people have one location where they spend their daytime 
hours (workplace) and one location where they spend their nighttime (home). One 
week of collecting just two data points about a person may fairly reveal the identity of 
the person.  
Location data may also indirectly describe what a person is doing through contextual 
inference. For example, frequent visits to clinics signal medical problems, attending 
meetings may reveal political preferences, and meetings with influential business 
managers could indicate pending business deals. As such, the problem of sharing 
location information is analogous to hospitals publishing medical records to 
epidemiologists and other medical researchers – it can beneficial to society but invades 
on privacy. 
1.3. Privacy policies and user behavior 
Privacy concerns raised by location-sharing were rapidly perceived by potential users, 
suggesting that a broad adoption may only happen to the extent that these concerns 
are adequately addressed. Despite their concern with their privacy, users cannot 
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anticipate how the location-sharing service is going to be used or the privacy policies 
that most suite their privacy concerns.   
Therefore, it is crucial to fully understand the user’s behavior when using location-
sharing applications in order to address their privacy concerns with an adequate design 
of user interfaces. This will most likely raise users’ comfort with location sharing and 
also severely reduce the probability of rejection. 
In this project we analyze the user’s behavior through time, specifically in terms of their 
privacy policies expressiveness (the type of restrictions being used and the way they are 
combined) and restrictiveness (how open/restrictive these policies are). 
1.4. Organization of the document 
The rest of this document is organized as follow. In chapter 2 we present the theories 
that supported the design and evolution of our location-sharing application, Locaccino. 
In chapter 3 we present the formal model and research methodology required for this 
type of project. This chapter also includes a description of Locaccino. In chapter 4 we 
present our results based on two studies, the first one intended to provide general 
insights, and the second one more focused in the specific aspects of users with mobile 
devices. Chapters 5 and 6 contain the discussion and the conclusions of this project. 
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2 Background 
Theories of both privacy and computer systems design are relevant for the study of 
privacy in location-sharing applications. We present some of these theories and also 
related work on the same topic. 
2.1. Theories 
We first present a brief description of the evolution of privacy theories. Then, we 
present role-base access control (RBAC), a predominant model for advanced security 
and privacy, which is used in the design of privacy policies (rules) in our location-sharing 
application (Locaccino). Finally, we list some of the design principles for secure systems 
and refer to how they are implemented in the same application. 
2.1.1. Privacy theories 
The demand for full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the 
common law. The exact nature and extent of such protection, as well as the challenge of 
dealing with the intangibility, were the main concerns that led to the definition of the 
right to privacy, still in the IXX century by Warren and Brandeis [7]. At that time, the 
right “to be let alone” was written largely in response to the increase in newspapers and 
photographs that invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life. The impact 
of the right to privacy was later emphasized by Justice Williams O. Douglas, as being the 
abutment of all freedom, in the sense that people have as much freedom as the 
restraint on others to keep off from them. 
More recently, Altman’s privacy regulation theory [8] presented privacy as a dynamic 
process that can change through time and is conditioned by both internal and external 
conditions. Altman also differentiates privacy desired levels from the actual levels of 
privacy achieved, defines an optimal level of privacy for each individual that not 
necessary the highest, and defines a two level hierarchy for privacy (individual and 
group privacy). 
This project makes use of Altman’s notion of privacy as a dynamic process of 
interpersonal boundary, by investigating the boundary interactions that condition how 
open or how closed is the individual’s attitude in regard to his/her location disclosure at 
any given moment. 
There has been significant discussion on the concept of information privacy as more and 
more systems controlling more information appear. Nevertheless, the existing global 
data privacy framework (APEC) has been recurrently criticized as incoherent and 
inefficient.  
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2.1.2. Role-based access control models 
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a widely accepted access control reference model as 
it significantly simplifies the paradigm of permission management. The permissions to 
perform certain operations are assigned to specific roles, therefore, users acquire 
permissions through their role and not through directly assignment. Permission 
management is significantly simplified with RBAC. 
In one of the first known works [9], the RBAC main concepts were presented, as well as 
the formal description of role and membership. In [10], a family of RBAC models is 
introduced and the role is presented as being the intermediary that brings together a 
collection of users, on one side, and a collection of permissions, on the other. 
Role-based access control models are applied for access control in Locaccino, namely 
with respect to the disclosure of locations of users. Its application is straightforward, 
making the intermediation of the Facebook groups and the privacy policies (rules). 
Locaccino makes use of Facebook social network, thus, the social groups are not pre-
defined. Instead, when users define their Facebook groups they are defining the groups 
that are used for access control – the group-based restrictions. 
Locaccino time-based and location-based restrictions are not relevant for roles. These 
forms of access control can be seen as a form of context-based access control (CBAC), 
but where the context is relative to the entity that provides the permissions. 
 
2.1.3. Design principles for secure systems 
Saltzer and Schroeder [11] had presented a set of design principles in 1974 that became 
universally accepted by the computer science and security community. Locaccino 
system design follows these principles, namely in the way privacy policies (rules) are 
implemented.  
Mechanism economy 
This principle states that the design of a system must be as simple and small as possible. 
Note however that privacy policies are inherently complex. Therefore, the types of 
restrictions and functionalities implemented in Locaccino user interface are the ones 
considered the less possible to adequately address user’s privacy concerns. 
Fail-safe defaults 
This principle states that all defaults must be fail-safe, i.e., conservative by default. In 
Locaccino, this is done by using default rules with maximum restrictiveness. When a 
user joins Locaccino, his or her location cannot be disclosed unless there is a rule 
modification. In other words, the default rule is “Deny All Requests”. 
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Complete mediation 
This principle states that every access to every object must be checked for 
authorization. The fact that all location requests are evaluated by the rule set (privacy 
policy) defined by the target user (authority) ensures the complete mediation. 
Psychological acceptability 
This principle refers to the usability, one of the main drivers of all the Locaccino design, 
namely in the user interface. For example, the usability in Locaccino user interface is 
ensured by the economy of the information displayed to the users (avoiding the user 
burden), by providing comprehensive functionalities to users, etc. 
Avoiding conflicts 
Despite not being referred in [11], avoiding conflicts is an important principle in the 
generic context of filtering and access control, which is why it is referred in [9].  
The simplest way of avoiding conflicts is by using exclusively one of the two mechanisms 
of filtering: whitelist or blacklist. Locaccino implements whitelist mechanisms solely 
(e.g., allow the location to a give user at a given daytime), therefore avoiding conflicts 
with economy of mechanisms. Alternatively, one could use whitelist and blacklist but 
relying in additional layers to detect, prevent and solve eventual conflicts. 
2.2. Related work 
Recent developments in geographical positioning and location-managing technologies 
combined with the generalized ubiquity of locatable devices (laptops, mobile phones) 
sustained the recent multitude of platforms in the market for location-sharing 
applications. Current examples of commercial location-sharing applications are Google 
Latitude, Yahoo Fire Eagle, Xtify, Loopt and Four Square[12][13][14][15][16]. 
A recent study [5], based on an online survey of American Internet users, revealed that 
most users are extremely concerned about controlling who has access to their locations. 
The same study revealed that, in general, the privacy controls in existing applications do 
not comprehensively address user’s privacy concerns. 
Next we present related work in several areas of privacy and location-sharing, and policy 
analysis. 
2.2.1. Privacy and location-sharing 
From a high-level perspective, past work on location privacy can be grouped into three 
distinct categories: computational, architectural and human aspects (user interface) 
[17]. The first two categories are intended to protect anonymity of a set of users, to 
limit what location information is collected and how that information can be queried.  
Our project focuses on the third category: the human aspects and user interfaces. 
Projects in this category are usually divided in the following specific areas of research: 
usability, expressiveness, and (more recently) mobility. 
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Usability 
Since location sharing rules are inherently complex and users typically cannot picture 
ahead of time all of their privacy concerns, the user interface must somehow provide 
some help along the process. 
In [17], the usefulness of a wide variety of functionalities is evaluated. One such 
example is the obfuscation of the evaluation of a location request, where the requestor 
cannot distinguish if the request is denied by a rule or simply because the target user is 
offline. Another example is a last seen functionality, which is considered uncomfortable 
privacy-wise for increasing the risk of tracing. 
The importance of feedback (the user being provided with information of who tried to 
locate him/her) is addressed in [18]. The study reveals the importance of this 
functionality for increasing the comfort of users with respect to sharing locations. The 
conclusion is achieved based on the comparison of the levels of privacy concerns of two 
groups of users: one that was provided with the feedback functionality and the other, 
from which the functionality remained hidden in the application. Feedback is important 
not only for awareness but also for deterrence, in the sense that users become more 
selective when requesting other’s locations if they are aware of the existence of 
feedback mechanisms in the application. 
Machine learning was used for deriving adequate default policies for helping users 
converge faster to their final privacy policies in [19]. The default rules are referred to be 
necessarily canonical and in small number (e.g., three rules), and some default rules are 
derived. 
Expressiveness 
The question of how much expressiveness and exactly which type of filters are required 
for user interfaces is central to location-sharing applications. Early work in [17][20] has 
identified the concerns of users to be mapped in the interfaces. The authors identified 
as being relevant, not only the type of rules to be implemented in the interfaces but also 
the granularity of the information disclosed. Interestingly, there does not seem to be 
consensus between the two analyses on whether obfuscation techniques are important 
in the location-sharing context. 
In [18], the specific types of rules that users considered as being useful were group-
based, time-based, location-based and proximity rules. The first three are already 
implemented in Locaccino, and were used in our study. In [20], the proximity of home 
address had already been identified by users as important to be implemented in user 
interfaces. 
An area of intensive research is location labeling (or naming). The fact that location 
labels (“home”, “workplace”, etc) are more meaningful to users than, e.g., their 
coordinates, makes location naming particularly important for the acceptability of 
location based rules. One interesting finding in [21] is that people are more open to 
sharing their location information in the form of place names than exact positions. 
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An interesting element related to privacy policy expressiveness is granularity, generally 
considered by users as being useful [19]. However, granularity is not necessarily desired 
by users for disclosing less location information. In [20], one of the conclusions is that 
some users just want to provide less information so that the information is more 
meaningful to the requestor. This type of granularity may also be associated to the 
distance between requestor and the target in this interaction. 
Mobility 
Early work on modeling the mobility of people using computers and mobile phones was 
presented in [22]. Here mobility is classified into three distinct classes: nomadic, cellular 
and pervasive. 
Today’s combination of pervasive computing and location-sharing brings enhanced 
mobility and opportunities to share locations and in more diverse contexts compared to 
the prior laptop scenario, but it also changes the location-sharing privacy and usability 
paradigm. Privacy concerns becomes even higher for smartphone users, and the 
constraints related to the smartphones (intermittent connectivity, reduced display 
dimensions, battery issues) result in additional challenges in terms of usability. 
In [23], an analysis of the smartphone security model for location-sharing is provided. 
The authors conclude that in this model, users may be interested in defining their 
group-based privacy policies not only based on the social network (e.g., Facebook) but 
also based on the contacts (which are typically distinct). Like in prior work, the proximity 
is referred by users as an important criterion for deciding whether to disclose or not the 
location. 
In [24], the uniqueness of locations visited by mobile users is presented as a factor that 
raises the privacy concerns related to the disclosure of those specific locations. This is a 
surprising result, in the sense that it demonstrates that mobile users are more 
comfortable sharing a location like their home rather than other locations visited 
occasionally. This may reveal a higher concern with privacy compared to security. An 
additional conclusion of this study is that mobile users generate more activity (location 
requests), visit more unique locations and have higher privacy concerns than laptop 
users. 
 
2.2.2. Policy analysis 
Understanding what level of control users need for protecting their privacy in location-
sharing applications may be achieved through the analysis of user’s privacy policies 
(rules). 
An example of policy analysis approach in the context of file sharing is presented in [25], 
based in data mining techniques. The context of file sharing has similarities with 
location-sharing, in the sense that rules are inherent complex. However, unlike in 
location sharing, users typically do not change the
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time. An interesting conclusion is that the complexity of rules can be decomposed in 
simpler (canonical) rules. 
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3 Research method  
In this chapter we start by presenting the model that formally describes users’ privacy 
policies and location requests. We follow by describing our framework aimed at 
understanding the dynamics of location-sharing user’s behavior when using a location-
sharing application: Locaccino. We then describe Locaccino with some detail. 
Lastly, we describe the two experiments that compose this project, highlighting the 
recruitment methodology and providing a generic characterization of the populations 
under analysis. 
3.1. Model 
In this section we present the necessary formalism to be used in the subsequent 
analysis of both privacy policies and location requests. We adapted the formal model 
defined in [26] for the current implementation of Locaccino privacy policies and the 
specific scope of this project, as follow. 
3.1.1. Definitions 
A privacy policy is a set of condition/action pairings that specify what actions should be 
taken under what circumstances. It is composed by a set of rules connected by logical 
disjunction. A rule describes the restrictions under which a given set of actions (disclose, 
withhold) may be executed.  These restrictions are defined as a logical conjunction of 
their elementary components (e.g., group-based, time-based, location-based 
restrictions). 
We consider a small set of events from the universe of all Locaccino system events: the 
location requests. Events (location requests) necessarily imply the evaluation of a 
privacy policy, resulting in a given action (disclose, withhold). 
A user is in a given condition if at least one of his/her policy modifications verifies the 
corresponding hypothesis. 
3.1.2. Privacy policies and location requests’ evaluation 
The following formal model describes the privacy policies and the evaluation of location 
requests given the target user’s privacy policy. 
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 Rule = IP(Restriction x Action) 
 Policy = IP(Rule) 
 Evaluate:: Policy x Event  IP(Action) 
 Action = {Disclose, Deny} 
 Event = {RequestTo, RequestFrom} 
 Restriction = WeeklyPattern U User U Group U LocationPattern 
 Group = IP(Group, Network) 
 TimeSpan = [StartTime .. EndTime] 
 WeeklyPattern = IP(Weekdays) x TimeSpan 
 GeoArea = (xy1, xy2) 
 LocationPattern = IP(GeoArea) 
 
3.1.3. Privacy policy management taxonomy 
The privacy policy management taxonomy allows us to decompose the privacy policy 
management process into a set of basic operations over which we can perform 
restrictiveness accountability to be analyzed through time. 
When users join Locaccino, the default privacy policies correspond to a null rule that 
enforces fail-safe defaults. This states that whatever event happens, the corresponding 
action always result in withhold at this stage. From then on, users can create rules, add 
restrictions to the existing rules, modify the restrictions, and delete existing rules 
restrictions and rules.  
Restriction management actions can be of one of the following types: 
 Group-based restriction: characterized by the users or networks that composes the 
group. For the sake of simplicity, we characterize this type of restriction according 
to the total number of elements of the group or network (g_elem). This variable is 
zero by default may take any non-negative integer value. 
 Time-based restriction: characterized by its weekly time span. For the sake of 
simplicity, we characterize this type of restriction according to its total number of 
hours (t_hours). This variable is zero by default and range from zero to 168 hours. 
 Location-based restriction: is characterized by a set of distinct locations (rectangles 
defined in Google Maps). For the sake of simplicity, we characterize this type of 
restriction according to the total number of locations (l_number). This variable is 
zero by default and can take any non-negative integer value. 
It is likely that users use one rectangle for defining a location like “home” and another 
rectangle for “workplace”, while the respective areas may depend on many factors, e.g., 
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the laziness of each user. Therefore the number of locations as a metric offers a good 
tradeoff between simplicity and meaningfulness. 
Each privacy policy management action directly affects the variables defined above. The 
creation of a rule, depending on the restrictions that compose the rule, sets the 
corresponding variables (n_elem and/or t_hours and/or l_number).  
Adding a restriction to an existing rule have a similar effect, but only the variable 
corresponding to the restriction being added is set (e.g., when a time-based restriction 
is added to an existing rule, t_hours is set). 
The modification of a rule implies the modification of the variables corresponding to the 
restrictions being modified. For each restriction, the modification may increment the 
variable, decrement the variable, or the variable may even remain constant (e.g., a 
modification in a time-based rule that swaps 4 hours of location sharing from Monday 
to Tuesday).  
The deletion of a rule sets all (n_elem, t_hours, l_number) variables to zero. The deletion 
of a specific restriction sets the corresponding specific variable to zero. 
3.1.4. Restrictiveness 
Restrictiveness is an intrinsic characteristic of restrictions associated to privacy policies 
(rules). It depends solely of the way the rule was defined. It does not depend of location 
requests or other events.  
The relation between restrictiveness and the variables defined above depend solely on 
the type of restriction (social, time-based, location-based). 
 Group-based restrictiveness: associated to a group-based restriction. We use the 
number of elements of a group (n_elem) as group restrictiveness metric (GR) 
provided with negative signal. Maximum restrictiveness corresponds to a group-
based restriction with an empty group; group restrictiveness decreases with the 
addition of elements to the rule. In the limit, a group-based restriction with an 
infinite number of elements corresponds to zero restrictiveness, which is equivalent 
to not using group-based filtering at all. 
 Time-based restrictiveness: associated to a time-based restriction. We use the total 
number of hours of sharing (t_hours ) within a week as time restrictiveness metric 
(TR) provided with negative signal. Maximum restrictiveness corresponds to a time-
based restriction with zero total hours of location sharing; minimum restrictiveness 
corresponds to the maximum number of hours of sharing (168). 
 Location-based restrictiveness: associated to a location-based restriction. We use 
the number of shared locations (each defined by rectangular geographic regions in 
Google Maps) as location restrictiveness metric (LR) provided with negative signal. 
Maximum restrictiveness corresponds to a location-based restriction with no 
shared locations; location restrictiveness decreases with the addition of locations to 
the rule. In the limit, a location-based rule with infinite number of locations 
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corresponds to zero restrictiveness, which is equivalent to not using location-based 
filtering at all. 
Rule restrictiveness is the restrictiveness associated to the combination of all existing 
restrictions (group-based, time-based and location-based) within a rule. Defining a 
metric for rule restrictiveness requires the use of normalized metrics for each of its 
components (restrictions). We denote the normalized restrictiveness metrics by NGR, 
NTR, NLR, referring to the normalized values of GR, TR and LT respectively. 
Evaluating a rule is equivalent to intercept (and() function) the restrictions that 
compose the rule. Therefore, rule restrictiveness, RR, is defined as 
RR = NGR x NTR x NLR 
The normalization of time-based restrictiveness is the only case in which the operation 
is straightforward. We simply divide TR by the total number of hours within a week 
(168), obtaining NTR. 
The normalization of group-based and location-based restrictiveness values can be 
done in several distinct ways. For group-based restrictiveness, we may divide GR by the 
user’s social network size, obtaining the NGR. For location-based restrictiveness, we 
may divide LR by the total number of distinct locations travelled by a given user, 
obtaining the LGR. 
Note that the normalization proposals for NGR and LGR above are not time-
independent, since both user’s social network and locations travelled may vary through 
time. Therefore, for analysis requiring time-independent restrictiveness metrics, 
alternative normalization solutions must be used. 
3.1.5. Openness 
Openness in the context of location-sharing can be defined according to diverse and 
distinct perspectives. We use a definition based on the disclose/deny ratio associated 
with the location requests targeted to a given user.  
For example, consider a user whose location is requested 5 times at a given day. From 
these location requests only 2 are evaluated with disclosure. For the remaining 3 
requests, the user is either hidden, offline, or the policy evaluates the request with 
“deny”. In such situation, the user has openness 40% at that given day.  
This openness definition is simple because it depends solely of the requests targeted to 
the user whose openness is being determined. However, strongly depends on the social 
network of a user. For instance, a user can raise/lower a friend’s openness by 
repeatedly requests his/her location at a given time where the disclosure is known to be 
permitted/denied.  
The simplicity of the our metric makes it simple to be implement and still provide 
enough information for the level of detail required in our experiment. We define the 
user openness more formally as follow. 
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Let U be the universe of users (user A, user B, user C, etc) and a given instant (day), d. 
The location requests performed by user A for user C are denoted by rAC1, rAC2 .., rACn. 
Location requests can be divided according to their evaluation. More specifically, we 
denote the sets of all requests targeting user C which result disclosure, deny, hidden 
and offline evaluations as rC|disclosure, rC|deny, rC|hidden, rC|offline respectively. We 
define the openness of user C for a given day, OPd(C), as   
OPd(C) = rC|Disclosure / (rC|deny + rC|hidden + rC|offline + rC|disclosure) 
 
3.1.6. Dynamic analysis of privacy policies 
Our dynamic analysis decomposes a set of events over time, highlighting the ordering of 
these events, which may be important to understand cause-effect relations. We present 
one example of a dynamic privacy policies analysis as follow. Figure 1 illustrates the 
type of information that is highlighted in a the dynamic analysis (shadowed flanks, 
corresponding to the user’s privacy policy modifications). 
The upper part of the graphic represents the dynamics of the location requests and the 
respective openness. The requests represented here are the ones targeted to the user 
under analysis. The lower part of the graphic represents the dynamics of the privacy 
policy restrictiveness. The three types of restrictions (group-based, time-based, 
location-based) are represented in this lower part by the respective restrictiveness 
values. 
 
Figure 1 – Example of dynamic analysis of privacy policies 
The privacy policy on the first day comprises at least one rule with at least one group 
restriction with 1 user. On the second day, the group-based restrictiveness decreased, 
meaning that either a new group-based restriction was added to an existing rule, or 3 
users were added to the existing restriction. The resulting group-based restrictiveness is 
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4 at this stage. On the fourth day, the group-based restrictiveness raises to two (the 
restriction becomes more restrictive again). The user may simply have removed two 
elements from a group-based restriction, for example. 
Several other privacy policy modifications occur throughout the twenty days of 
temporal analysis. What is important to emphasize in this example is that the goal of 
the dynamic analysis is to collect information about the user’s privacy policy transitions 
(shaded areas). 
Based on the dynamic analysis described above, we are interested in classifying users 
according to their privacy policy restrictiveness trend. The main goal of this 
classification is to understand if there is a generalized trend amongst Locaccino users. 
The fact that Locaccino uses fail-safe defaults for privacy policies (i.e., default policies 
that have maximum restrictiveness) results that a first policy modification necessarily 
transforms the policy into a less restrictive policy. From then on, subsequent 
modifications can transform the policy into more restrictive or less restrictive.  
We use the following restrictiveness trend classification: 
 Alternate: Users that make several changes in their policies, making them more or 
less restrictive. 
 Constant: Users that perform one unique modification in their policies or that 
perform policy modifications that do not affect the resulting restrictiveness.  
 Monotonic (decreasing): Users whose (all) policies modifications result less 
restrictive. 
 
3.1.7. Feedback hypothesis 
Time series with user’s privacy policy restrictiveness and requests can be used for 
inferring the reasoning behind user privacy policy management, by looking for events in 
the vicinity of each rule modification that may have triggered the users’ actions. 
Locaccino users can observe the requests targeted them and the respective requests’ 
evaluation. A description of this mechanism is provided in 3.3.1, where the Locaccino 
page “Who’s Located Me” is scrutinized. In fact, for experimental reasons, some 
Locaccino were not provided with this functionality. However, we disqualified those 
users whenever necessary. 
The feedback hypothesis states that the awareness (feedback) of location requests 
targeted to a give user (and respective evaluation) may trigger the decision to modify 
the privacy policy. Feedback can be used to support privacy policy management in two 
ways.  
A negative feedback (denied location request), a user may modify the policy into a more 
open policy. On the other hand, the observation of accepted requests may trigger the 
modification of the policy into a more restrict policy as to protect the user from 
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undesired location disclosures. Note that both cases are denoted as the feedback 
hypothesis. Due to the simplicity of the model in use, the hypothesis is necessary but 
not sufficient. 
More formally, the feedback condition implies that 
1) At least a rule modification is preceded by denied/accepted location requests 
targeted to the user under analysis 
2) the rule modification occurs within at most one day after the denied/accepted 
requests 
3) that rule modification affects the restrictiveness 
4) there is a direct effect on the user openness at most one day after that rule 
modification 
The following figure illustrates an example of the feedback condition.  
 
Figure 2 - Feedback condition illustration 
In the example there are two instants with policy modifications, the first (1st day) with 
group and time-based restriction modifications, and the second (3rd day) with time-
based restriction modification only.  
The feedback condition is verified for the time-based restriction modification performed 
at the 3rd day. The four conditions are signaled in the figure, meaning that all of them 
occur for this policy modification. 
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3.2. Framework 
3.2.1. Methodology 
Several methods taken from social sciences have been adapted and employed for 
capturing generic user’s feedback towards privacy. Two key factors decisively determine 
the potential bias in user’s responses: user burden and situatedness [27]. The “cost” of 
each method is determined by its scalability, which is illustrated as follow. 
 
Figure 3 - Methods for capturing user’s feedback 
Surveys can have a bounded user burden, depending on the length and content, but are 
not adequate for capturing the feedback “in situ”. Compared to the surveys, Experience 
Sampling Method [28] provides context to the users, thus, enhancing situatedness. 
Laboratory methods that simulate users’ activity have reduced cost but are condemned 
to be artificial.  
Usage data (automatic logging) is particularly suited for capturing the behavior of users 
when using an application because it is inherently “in situ”. Moreover, it allows 
researchers to circumvent users’ inaccurate perceptions of their own knowledge about 
privacy technology and vulnerabilities [29].  
An additional strength of automatic logging, compared to traditional methods, is 
reproducibility: once developed, the framework can be used for other populations and 
studies. The adequate selection of the information (variables of interest) being logged 
and the respective logging rate determines the scalability of this method. 
The framework developed in this project makes use of two studies that employ both 
surveys and automatic logging, thus, it can be seen as a hybrid method that results from 
the combination of automatic logging with surveys. 
3.2.2. Dynamic analysis 
Our framework allows analyzing through time the information collected from Locaccino 
database. Unlike in previous approaches, this type of analysis takes into consideration 
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the temporal dimension and the ordering of events and is expected to reveal aspects in 
user’s behavior that would otherwise remain unrevealed.  
The dynamic analysis of user’s privacy policy management and location requests require 
some prior design decisions. Examples of such design decisions are the temporal 
window size, temporal granularity and time alignment. 
Temporal window size 
It is handy to define a fixed window size in order to be able to scale in our analysis. By 
limiting the analysis to the same temporal window for all users, we can analyze a group 
of users with certain characteristics or even an entire population.  
This design option involves the following tradeoff: an excessively restricting the window 
size might lead to missing relevant data, however, long duration studies may become 
too expensive. 
In our project we use an initial (conservative) temporal window size of 300 days. Using 
this initial window size, we determine a more practical value based on the analysis of 
the population of Locaccino users. 
Temporal granularity 
The choice of the temporal granularity strongly depends on the type of events to be 
analyzed. It could seem that the finer granularity the better, however, such approach 
can result in excess of information, resulting in missing the “big picture”. 
We use daily time granularity in our analysis. Moreover, we filter rule modifications that 
occur within short time periods because this kind of user behavior typically has to do 
with usability issues (user making mistakes while defining the privacy policy). 
Time alignment 
There are basically two options regarding time alignment in the temporal analysis: 
aligning or not. Time alignment must be performed if the topic of research is relative 
time (in opposition to global time). 
An absolute time analysis could be interesting in case of knowledge of external events 
to be correlated with privacy policies modifications. For example, we could analyze the 
connection between large scale events (e.g., Independence Day) with user behavior 
patterns. 
In our project, we use relative time. For each user the temporal analysis begins in the 
day of joining Locaccino and ends in the end of the study. We assume that no significant 
external events occurred that could induce biases to our analysis. 
3.3. Locaccino 
Locaccino is an application developed by the Carnegie Mellon’s Mobile Commerce 
Laboratory in collaboration with CUPS, as part of the university’s User-Controllable 
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Security and Privacy project [30]. It is intended to better understand people’s privacy 
preferences in the context of location-sharing. 
Locaccino is comprised of two main components: the web application and the locator 
(client) software. Several locators exist, since this software is device and OS specific. 
The web application has user interface available as Facebook [31] application, which is 
convenient for reusing users’ existing social network. This is where users can define and 
refine their privacy policies (rules), request their friend’s locations and make use of 
some additional features. 
The locator is the component of the software that is device and OS dependent. Users 
can install the locator on their laptops or on their smartphones. The software transmits 
the user’s location to the Locaccino database every five to ten minutes [24] and 
provides the user with some controls (e.g., becoming invisible).  
The Locaccino database stores locations of users transmitted by the locator software 
and also usage data, e.g., the location requests and privacy policy modifications. 
 
3.3.1. Web application 
The web application is divided into four main areas: “Home”, “Privacy Settings”, “Who 
Can Locate Me” and “Who’s Located Me”. 
Home 
The first area, “Home”, is where the user can see his/her Facebook friends that are also 
Locaccino users. The user can then request their location individually or request the 
location of all friends within a certain range of proximity, with the “Show friends” 
feature. 
Additionally, the user can request his/her own location, see some recommendations, 
and define settings related to Google Maps (“Map”, “Satellite”, “Hybrid”, “Terrain”). 
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Figure 4 – Locaccino home page 
 
Privacy Settings 
This page is where the user can define the privacy policies that determine who, when 
and where can other users see his/her locations. In other words, in the privacy settings 
page the user can create, edit and delete the rules that serve as the basis for access 
control of location disclosure.  Rules may be based in any combination of three types of 
restrictions: 
 Group-based restrictions: define who can see the user’s locations. It applies either 
to individual Facebook friends or entire networks of users with something in 
common. 
 Time-based restrictions: define when the user’s location can be disclosed. It is 
defined in terms of weekdays and time spans with granularity of half hours. 
 Location-based restrictions: define the geographical area (rectangles in Google 
Maps) where the location of the user can be disclosed. 
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Figure 5 – Locaccino privacy settings page 
We address in detail the topic of privacy policies, presenting the necessary formalism in 
section 3.1.2. 
Who Can Locate Me 
This page is intended to provide privacy awareness to the user, in the sense that the 
user can see at a given instant and free of ambiguities, the result of restriction 
evaluation for the group of friends. This page is also important for allowing users to 
confirm and correct their privacy policies, i.e., to easily evaluate whether the rules are 
producing the desired results at a given instant in time. 
The following figure illustrates this mechanism. The group of friends of the user is 
basically split into two categories: the ones that can view the user current location and 
the ones that cannot. 
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Figure 6 - Locaccino “Who can locate me” page 
 
Who’s Located Me 
This page provides users with feedback about the friends that requested their location. 
There is a record for each request, with the requestor, timestamp of the request, 
location and address of the target user and the outcome of the request. The outcome 
results from the evaluation of the privacy policy of the target user for the specific 
location request and can be “Allow”, “Deny”, “Offline” or “Hidden”. 
This information is useful for deterrence, for helping users refine their rules, and also to 
provide audit information for research purposes. Users may provide a score in a likert 
scale referring to how comfortable they feel about each of the location requests. As 
referred before, this auditing mechanism has the strength of capturing “in situ” and in a 
contextualized fashion how comfortable users feel with each request. Figure 7 
illustrates Locaccino “Who’s Located Me” page. 
3.3.2. Locators 
There are currently two types of locators for Locaccino, targeted at laptop (Mac or 
Windows O.S.) computers and (Symbian O.S.) smartphones. Locators are installed on 
client machines and periodically send the machine’s current location to the Locaccino 
server.  
Wi-Fi positioning is the location mechanism used in laptop clients and in smartphone 
clients whenever GPS in unavailable. Wi-Fi positioning makes use of Skyhook (for 
generic locations) and CMU (specifically for the CMU campus) databases for correlating 
the access point information with the respective addresses. The smartphone locators 
also make use of GPS, which is the default location mechanism. 
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Figure 7 - Locaccino “Who’s located me” (feedback) page 
Additionally, the locator implements a small set of functionalities that are more or less 
limited depending on the type of device where the location is installed. The motivation 
behind these functionalities is to enhance the usability of Locaccino, by allowing the 
user to perform the most basic operations without requiring the access to Facebook. 
Examples of functionalities implemented in all locators are sign out/becoming invisible, 
and simplified versions of “Who’s located me” and “Who can locate me”. 
Laptop locator 
The laptop locator makes use of Wi-Fi positioning technology. Most Locaccino 
functionalities are implemented in the laptop locator, some of them in a simplified 
format for usability reasons. The definition of the privacy policies is the main exception, 
which requires the use of the Web application. The functionalities available in the 
laptop locator are illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 8 – Laptop locator (Windows OS) 
Mobile locator 
The mobile client was developed for the Symbian mobile OS and has been extensively 
tested on the Nokia N95 [24]. The mechanisms used for tracking the user’s location are 
Wi-Fi or GPS positioning. The locator determines at any instant which of the two 
mechanisms to use depending of which one is available. In case both are available, it 
chooses the one that minimizes the power consumption. The GSM triangulation is still 
not implemented in this locator. 
Examples of functionalities that, unlike in the laptop client, are present in the mobile 
client are the “Show Friends” functionality and the friends list. The following figure 
illustrates the “Show friends” functionality on the Nokia N95. 
 
Figure 9 – Mobile locator 
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3.4. Experiment 
We analyze two studies: long-term users study and mobile study.  
One initial goal of the long-term users study is to find generic parameters to be used as 
rule of thumb in studies based on dynamic analysis for location-sharing applications. 
Examples of such parameters are the temporal window of analysis, the number of 
expected critical instants in user’s privacy policy modification, and the time-to-converge 
of user’s privacy policies. The mobile result is specifically focused in a closely analyze a 
comparison of laptop and smartphone users. 
Both studies have some known limitations. In the long term-study, users experienced 
Locaccino possibly with distinct versions, meaning that they may have experienced 
minor differences in the functionalities implemented. They also might have experienced 
distinct recruitment methodologies: some may have been participants of field studies, 
while others may spontaneously have added Locaccino application in Facebook. 
The mobile study has a small sized population (n = 28). The main reason for this was 
that the field study took place in the university environment during the summer, when 
most students are on vacations. 
3.4.1. Long-term users study 
This study involves the analysis of the Locaccino users whose activity duration is longer 
than one month (31 days). The reasoning behind this criterion is to select users that had 
enough time to change their privacy policies and were locatable through a long enough 
period to have an incentive to change their privacy policies.  
We query the Locaccino user database using as main criterion the difference between 
the lowest and highest user timestamps in the system. We subtract to this group of 261 
users the ones that participated in studies with hidden functionalities, e.g., users that 
were not provided with the feedback functionality. By disqualifying these users we 
ensure that the whole sample is provided with similar user interface, except for minor 
details.  
Nevertheless, the group of 28 users that was not provided with the feedback 
functionality is used as a control group specifically for the validation of our feedback 
hypothesis. 
Users that never modified their privacy policy are also disqualified since they do not 
provide information of interest for our project. The resulting group of users is denoted 
by “long-term users”.  
The policy management actions and the requests corresponding to these 144 users are 
the subject of our analysis. We exclude self-requests from this analysis because this type 
of requests belong to a distinct human behavior paradigm than the one that is subject of 
analysis. 
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Figure 10 and Table 2 characterize the sample in terms of the period of time in which 
the users were active in Locaccino. The six leftmost bars of the histogram correspond to 
the users that do not match the long-term criterion. All other users are considered to 
have long-term Locaccino experience. 
Mean 48 
Standard Deviation 56 
Median 30 
3rd Quartile 69 
Maximum 256 
Table 2 – Activity time period for long-term users 
Users from this study resulted from distinct recruitment methods: some joined 
Locaccino spontaneously, others received the incentives of a specific field study and 
others were invited by study users.  
Users may also have experienced different versions of Locaccino, which can result in 
potential sources of bias in our analysis. Therefore, this study is intended to provide 
generic insights. 
 
Figure 10 – Locaccino user’s experience duration 
 
3.4.2. Mobile study 
This one month field study was intended to investigate the impact of mobility on location 
sharing. Participants of this study were recruited from the Carnegie Mellon University 
population using fliers and posts on electronic message boards. Participants were 
compensated $30 for their participation in the study. Participation consisted of four phases: 
the pre-study, the installation of Locaccino, Locaccino utilization and the post-study survey. 
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Pre-study 
In the pre-study, potential participants completed a questionnaire that was used to evaluate 
their eligibility. Eligibility requirements included 
 University membership 
 Being user of Facebook 
 Regular use of a laptop or smartphone 
 Being current customers of AT&T or T-Mobile cellular services (necessary for the 
operation of the smartphone locator) 
Additional questions were included in the pre-study survey regarding the potential users’ 
technical expertise, demographics and attitudes towards privacy. Eligible participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions:  
 laptop users (n = 11) 
 smartphone users (n = 17) 
Installation phase 
The installation phase consisted in the installation of the Locaccino Facebook application and 
the locator client (described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively). While laptop 
participants simply installed the locator client in their laptops (Windows or Linux OS), 
smartphone participants installed the mobile locator client on their provided Nokia N95. 
Smartphone users were instructed to use the provided Nokia N95 as their primary phone, 
installing their personal SIM card phone. They were also required to have an active data 
communication plan, for which they were compensated an additional $15 for their data 
usage. 
Utilization phase 
Participants used Locaccino for a period of (at least) 4 weeks. Laptop users were instructed 
to have the locator running for at least an average of 5 daily hours. Using the provided Nokia 
N95 as their primary phone was considered sufficient for ensuring a minimum level of 
activity for smartphone users. 
All participants were asked to audit location requests 3 times a week on non-consecutive 
days. Whenever the instructions were not followed for more than 2 days, users were 
reminded by e-mail. 
After the 4 weeks of utilization, participants were asked to fill an exit survey. Smartphone 
participants returned their Nokia N95 phones. 
Post-study 
In the post-study survey, participants were asked about location privacy according to their 4 
weeks experiences. First, they were asked to rate their comfort levels with sharing 12 
specific locations with 5 social groups:  
 Immediate family 
 Close friends 
 Acquaintances 
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 Anyone from the university population 
 Everybody 
The 12 specific locations were randomly sampled from among each user’s locations 
travelled. For the (laptop) participants that were not observed in 12 distinct locations, all the 
distinct locations were asked to be rated. A likert 4-point scale was used, ranging from very 
uncomfortable (1) to very comfortable (4). Its phrasing and presentation were very similar to 
the auditing interface described in section 3.3.1. 
Most participants that dropped out did so before the installation phase. Only 6 participants 
dropped out during the utilization phase, 3 in each group. 
Data analysis 
Our motivation in analyzing the usage data of this study is to analyze the user’s privacy 
policy management through time. We also analyze the dynamics of the user’s location 
requests to provide context awareness. 
We removed the self requests from our data, which correspond to 31.5% of the total 
requests, because we are interested uniquely in requests that have privacy threat potential. 
We confirmed that all users had the feedback functionality enabled.  
We analyze users without the feedback functionality uniquely for the validation of our 
feedback hypothesis on the long-terms users. The group of users without feedback enabled 
is used for control. 
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4 Results 
 
The analysis of the data collected in the two experiments, described in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, 
conducted to the results presented in the next two sections respectively.  
For each study we provide results based on a static analysis of the location requests and 
privacy policy management process. Then, we provide the results of the respective 
dynamic analysis. Finally, based on the dynamic analysis, we analyze the hypothesis of 
the policy management process being influenced by the feedback observation. 
4.1. Long-term users study results 
One initial goal of the long-term users study is to find generic parameters to be used as 
rule of thumb in dynamic analysis studies for location-sharing applications. Examples of 
such parameters are the temporal window of analysis, the number of expected critical 
instants in user’s privacy policy modification, and the time-to-converge of user’s privacy 
policies. 
After a brief characterization of the Locaccino long-term users, we move to the static 
and dynamic analysis in respect to users’ privacy policy management and location 
requests. 
4.1.1. Experiment design parameters 
In this section we derive temporal design parameters, based on the observation of the 
temporal windows of user’s generic activity. Note that any user-triggered event that is 
time stamped by Locaccino (e.g., location requests) is considered as generic activity in 
this context. We determine the number of days of Locaccino activity for each user and 
observe users’ distribution in respect to this parameter.  
We then repeat the same procedure for activities uniquely related to privacy policy 
management. Figure 11 allows comparing the resulting temporal differences for generic 
activity and privacy policy management.  
Most users’ activity lasts around hundred days. However, the number of users whose 
activity lasts between 100 and 200 days is non-negligible. This contrasts with the privacy 
policy management distribution, in which users typically define their privacy policies 
within a much shorter temporal window.  Policy changes obey a power law distribution, 
where most users make the majority of the privacy policy modifications at the first days 
of usage. 
Table 3 contains the resume of the temporal parameters of interest. Columns time of 
first change, time of last change and time duration have values in number of days. Time 
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duration is the time difference between the days of the first and last change. For this 
calculation we considered only users with more than one change. 
On average, the first policy modification occurs on the 9th day of a user’s Locaccino 
experience, while the last one occurs at the 17th day. Based on Table 3, our suggestion 
for the approximate observation period is the 3rd quartile of the fist policy modification 
added to the 3rd quartile of the privacy policy management window, calculated for the 
users that performed more than one policy modification. This results in the approximate 
value of 45 days (6 weeks).  
 
Figure 11 – Time duration of Locaccino user’s activity 
 
 
Time of 
first change 
Time of 
last change 
Number 
of changes 
Time duration (*) 
 
Mean 8.8 16.6 1.5 31.1 
Standard Deviation 24 34.8 1.2 42 
Median 1 2 1 7.5 
3rd Quartile 4 12.5 1.2 42.2 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 226 226 9 133 
Table 3 – Privacy policy management parameters’ characterization 
 
4.1.2. Static analysis 
This section is intended to characterize the population of Locaccino long-term users, 
based on descriptive statistics. This generic (static) characterization may be seen as the 
abutments over which lies the forthcoming dynamic analysis. 
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Location requests and openness 
Table 4 provides the characterization of the long-term users’ population in terms of 
location requests (performed by and targeted to) and the respective evaluation 
(openness). 
Number of requests per requestor 146 
Number of requests per target 111 
Total number of requests 65493 
Proportion of denied requests 8.5% 
Proportion of hidden requests 4.3% 
Proportion of offline requests 58.5% 
Proportion of disclosed requests 28.8% 
Table 4 – Long-term user’s characterization in terms of location requests and openness 
There is a clear asymmetry between requestor and target, meaning that, on average, 
users from this study typically perform more requests than the requests that are aimed 
to themselves. One justification for this asymmetry is the existence of the functionality 
“locate all” in Locaccino that allows users to locate multiple targets at once. 
In terms of openness, the majority (58.5%) of the location requests are denied due to 
the fact that the user is offline. Apart from offline denied requests, most location 
requests result in disclosure (28.8% versus 12.8% of hidden plus requests denied by the 
users’ policies). 
Privacy policy management 
We start by presenting the temporal characterization of users’ privacy policy 
management, which is based on information from Table 3. We highlight the following 
observations: 
 Long-term users modify their privacy policies at most in 9 distinct days 
 Privacy policy time-to-converge of long-term users with more than one policy 
change is 1 month on average 
 Only 5.5% of (long-term) users perform more than 2 privacy policy changes  
 Only 25% of (long-term) users perform more than 1 privacy policy change 
Table 5 provides the results from the analysis of the distribution of the privacy policy 
expressiveness and the respective restrictiveness. The three columns represent the 
distinct types of restrictions that compose the expressiveness spectrum. 
Clearly, social (group-based) restrictions are the most used (45.3%). Additionally, the 
use of location-based restrictions for changing the privacy policy occurs on average 
around 3 days later than group and time-based restrictions. It is unclear whether this 
results from usability issues or if it is a user-intrinsic factor (users not interested in using 
this type of restrictions). 
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Group Time Location 
Restrictions distribution 45.3% 30.5% 24.2% 
Day of use (mean) 24.5 23.9 27.1 
Day of use (std) 44.7 43 46.5 
Restrictiveness (mean) -8.4 -49 -1.4 
Restrictiveness (std) 13.5 41.4 0.5 
Restrictiveness (min) -140 -168 -3 
Table 5 – Expressiveness (static) characterization of long-term users 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 provide complementary information of group and time-based 
restrictiveness distributions, illustrating how users typically use these types of 
restrictions. 
 
Figure 12 – Group-based restrictiveness distribution 
 
Figure 13 – Time-based restrictiveness distribution 
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We summarize the results from the static analysis of privacy policies restrictiveness as 
follow: 
 Group: 8 is a popular choice for the number of elements for a group-based rule. This 
value results from mere empirical observation (Figure 12) and may be important for 
the design of highly constrained user interfaces (e.g., in mobile devices). 
 Time: this type of restrictiveness is significantly biased by its default value, 
equivalent to 10 weekly hours of location sharing on weekdays (Figure 13). 
 Location: the low number of locations used to address location-based 
restrictiveness suggests either the existence of usability issues for this specific type 
of restriction or people’s lack of interest for this type of restriction.  
4.1.3. Dynamic analysis 
The dynamic analysis presented in this section focus on the evolution of location requests , 
privacy policy changes and openness through time. It includes the evaluation of user 
behavioral hypothesis (feedback hypothesis) in respect to the user’s privacy policy 
management. 
Location requests and openness 
Firstly, we analyze the dynamics of the aggregate user’s requests and respective 
openness. This aims at understanding the temporal distribution of the user activity of 
requesting other’s locations and vice-versa. Figure 14 illustrates this for both locator and 
target perspectives. We use normalized values for the number of requests for an easier 
comparison. 
 
Figure 14 – Dynamics of long-term aggregate (all users) location requests 
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Our observations are: 
 Despite the generalized initial decrement of requests, there is a lower bound on the 
location-request activity 
 The level of denied (including offline and hidden) requests is consistently above the level 
of disclosed requests 
Privacy policy management 
There are two main goals in the dynamic analysis of privacy policy expressiveness: 
understanding if distinct types of restrictions are used in distinct times, and understanding 
users’ evolution in terms of their use of expressiveness through time.  
We expect users to become savvier in their privacy policy management process through 
time, however, it is not straightforward whether this evolution is visible within the 
observation temporal window in use. 
Figure 15 illustrates the dynamics of expressiveness through the user’s policy modification 
stage (iteration). The analysis is restricted to the first three policy iterations, since the 
number of users that have more than three changes is negligible. The percent values 
represent the distribution of each type of restriction in respect to the overall expressiveness. 
 
Figure 15 - Dynamics of privacy policy expressiveness (per iteration) 
The main observations from this analysis are: 
 The percentage of composite rules increases (33%, 41%, 62%) with the privacy 
policy modification stage, suggesting that users that perform more modifications in 
their policies also use a richer combination of restrictions in their later 
modifications. 
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 Modifications in rules affecting exclusively the group-based restrictions tend to 
decrease (42%, 32%, 25%) with the policy modification stage, compared to other 
restrictions. 
 Time-based restrictions converge in just two policy iterations. This suggests that 
time, as a criteria for restricting one’s location, is intrinsically more static than the 
social network or the locations travelled. 
We follow with the classification of the users in terms of their privacy policy 
restrictiveness trend. The formal description of the privacy policy restrictiveness trend 
classification is provided in section 3.1.6. The population under study is distributed as 
follow: 
 Alternate restrictiveness: Few users (3.5%) have this profile. 
 Constant restrictiveness: Most users (75.7%) have this profile. 
 Monotonic (decreasing): 20.8% of users have this profile. 
We notice that most users have a very passive attitude concerning their privacy policy. 
This is revealed by the fact that for most users, the restrictiveness remains constant 
after a first modification. More interestingly, we notice that the great majority of the 
remainder 74.3% users only modify the privacy policy making it more open (less 
restrict). 
The following figure illustrates the privacy policy expressiveness distribution according 
to the trend profile. The percent values represent the distribution of each type of 
restriction in respect to the overall expressiveness. 
 
Figure 16 – Use of expressiveness according to privacy policy restrictiveness trend 
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The results from Figure 16 are aligned with the results from Figure 15. Users that modify 
their privacy policy only once tend to use less composite restrictions. Users with more 
privacy policy management iterations and making use of more types of restrictiveness 
modifications, also make use of more composite restrictions in their privacy policies. 
Finally, we analyze the dynamics of the aggregated privacy policy restrictiveness. The 
use of normalized restrictiveness values provide the information of how the 
restrictiveness (of distinct types) decreases trough time, which is illustrated in Figure 17. 
Prior analysis of Figure 15 revealed that the significance of group-based restrictions in 
the overall user’s expressiveness tend to decrease. The aggregated cumulative 
restrictiveness analysis confirms this result. For example, on the 3rd day, users already 
used, on average, 72% of their group-based restrictiveness but only 53% of their time-
based and location-based restrictiveness. 
 
Figure 17 – Aggregated cumulative restrictiveness dynamics 
 
Feedback hypothesis 
In this section we evaluate the feedback hypothesis, presented in section 3.1.7. We 
evaluate the hypothesis in regard to users who had access to feedback and also for the 
ones that were not provided with feedback (control group).  
Our results reveal that the feedback hypothesis holds true for 27.1% of the users that 
were provided with feedback and 17.9% for the ones that were not provided with 
feedback. Based on this analysis, feedback seems to have an important role, not only in 
users’ privacy awareness, but also in users’ privacy policy management. 
The average number of policy modifications and the average time-to-converge of 
policies are also higher for the feedback group. 
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Feedback No Feedback 
Feedback hypothesis 27.1% 17.9% 
Group-based changes 68% 54% 
Policy changes (mean) 1.45 1.29 
Temporal window (mean) 31.2 15.7 
Table 6 – Comparison between feedback and no-feedback groups (long-term users) 
Additionally, we notice that privacy policy modifications that fall in the feedback-driven 
category typically involve a higher usage of group-based restrictions (62% for 
uncorrelated modifications versus 83% for users in the feedback condition). 
Locaccino feedback page provides information of both locator, time of request and 
location of the target, i.e., it provides information that can be used for refining all the 
three types of restrictions. However, users seem to use more predominantly the locator 
information than the temporal and geographical contextual information for refining 
their privacy policies. 
4.2. Mobile study results 
The inclusion of the mobile study in this project has two main goals: to validate some 
results of 14.1 (which rely on sample not necessarily recruited under the same 
conditions) and to investigate the differences in privacy policy management when users 
are using Locaccino in their smartphones rather than (the most common scenario) in 
their laptops.  
The results of the mobile study are presented in two distinct sections, the first for the 
static comparative analysis and the second for the dynamic comparative analysis. 
4.2.1. Static analysis 
In this section we provide a generic comparative characterization of the population 
being studied. This generic (static) characterization may be seen as the abutments over 
which lies the forthcoming dynamic analysis. 
Location requests and openness 
The location requests activity of users and the respective requests evaluation (openness) are 
presented in Table 7, according to the type of device. The requestor and target columns 
identify the device of the user that performs the location request and the user whose 
location is requested, respectively. We denote as “outside” the users (either requestor or 
target) that do not belong to the population of the study. 
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Requestor 
 
Target 
 
Number of 
Requests 
Denied 
requests 
Hidden 
requests 
Offline 
requests 
Disclosed 
requests 
laptop laptop 610 1,0% 3.0% 25.7% 70.3% 
laptop smartphone 56 0.0% 0.0% 30.4% 69.6% 
laptop Outside 226 9.7% 15.0% 54.9% 20.4% 
smartphone laptop 59 3.4% 25.4% 16.9% 54.2% 
smartphone smartphone 788 3.7% 1.4% 39.6% 55.3% 
smartphone Outside 1208 1.7% 2.3% 83.0% 13.0% 
Outside laptop 195 2.1% 25.1% 48.7% 24.1% 
Outside smartphone 468 18.2% 0.0% 26.5% 55.3% 
Table 7 – Location requests and respective evaluation for laptop and smartphone users 
In Table 8, we present the results that highlight the differences in the (aggregate) requests 
of laptop and smartphone users, as well as the respective openness.  
The requests by participant column contain the total number of requests performed by 
participants specifically in the laptop/smartphone group. The requests to participant column 
contain the total number of requests performed to participants specifically in the 
laptop/smartphone group. The openness of participants column contains the average 
openness of participants according to their laptop/smartphone group. 
Participant’s 
device 
Requests 
by participant 
Requests 
to participant 
Openness 
of participants 
Laptop 44.6 43.2 49.60% 
Smartphone 186.8 119.3 60.10% 
Table 8 – Laptop versus smartphone user’s comparative openness 
We resume the analysis of the tables above in the following observations: 
 Smartphone users perform more requests than laptop users (186.8 versus 44.6 requests 
per requestor user during the period of observation). 
 Smartphone users’ location is more requested (119.3 versus 43.2 requests per target 
user during the period of observation) 
 Smartphone location disclose rate is also higher (60.1% versus 49.6% of the location 
requests were accepted).  
The fact that the disclose rate values for this study are much higher than the ones obtained 
in 4.1 may find justification in the recently developed Locaccino functionality that allow 
users to know ahead of time which friends are locatable. Nevertheless, there is a weak 
relation between the mobility and the openness of users. 
Privacy policy management 
The temporal parameters of both smartphone and laptop policy management activity 
are presented in the following table. The first three rows of the table characterize the 
users in respect to their privacy policy modifications and the last row refers to (generic) 
policy modifications. All values refer to average number of days except the user’s 
(average number of) policy modifications. 
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Smartphone Laptop All 
User’s first policy modification 3 1.3 2 
User’s policy modifications 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Temporal policy MGMT window 3.3 0.8 1.8 
Generic policy modification 4.4 1.9 3.2 
Table 9 – Privacy policy management temporal characterization 
The differences between smartphone users and laptop users in respect to their privacy 
policy management temporal parameters are presented as follow.  
 Smartphone users, on average, start modifying their privacy policies later. 
 Smartphone users, on average, perform more policy modifications. 
 Smartphone users, on average, make use of a larger temporal window for policy 
modification.  
 Privacy policy modifications occur later on average for smartphone users. This 
temporal offset is of 2.7 days for the first modification and 3.3 for generic policy 
modifications. 
Privacy policy expressiveness 
A comparative analysis of the privacy policy expressiveness between laptop and 
smartphone users is provided in the following figure. The percent values represent the 
distribution of each type of restriction in respect to the overall expressiveness.  
 
Figure 18 – Privacy policy expressiveness distribution for laptop and smartphone users 
The most relevant differences between smartphone and laptop users in respect to their 
privacy policy expressiveness are: 
 Smartphone users use less combined restrictions. This may be related to usability 
issues specific of the mobile interface or to the fact that the same usability issues 
have more negative impact in mobile platforms. 
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 Smartphone users make use of less location-based restrictiveness (8% versus 15%), 
which is odd, since these are the users that have a wider spectrum of locations to 
share/restrict. 
 
4.2.2. Dynamic analysis 
The dynamic analysis presented in this section focus on the evolution through time of 
location requests (and respective openness) and privacy policy management (and respective 
restrictiveness). The former includes the evaluation of user behavioral hypothesis in respect 
to the user’s privacy policy management. 
Location requests and openness 
The analysis of the dynamics of the aggregate user’s requests and respective openness 
aims at understanding the temporal distribution of the user activity of requesting 
other’s locations and vice-versa. Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate, for laptop and 
smartphone users respectively, both the locator and target perspectives. We use 
normalized values for the requests values. 
 
Figure 19 – Dynamics of laptop user’s location requests 
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Figure 20 - Dynamics of smartphone user’s location requests 
The dynamics of laptop and smartphone user’s location requests do not reveal significant 
differences. As previously noticed, there is a small (approximately 2 days) temporal offset of 
smartphone users, resulting from starting their activity slightly later than laptop users. The 
location requests of smartphone users are more concentrated (in contiguous time periods) 
than the requests of laptop users (more sparse). 
Privacy policy management 
The dynamic analysis of mobile user’s privacy policy management is based in the 
aggregation of all users’ policy restrictiveness according to the type of restriction. Figure 21, 
Figure 22 and Figure 23 illustrate the scenarios with all users of the mobile study, laptop 
users only, and smartphone users only (respectively). 
 
Figure 21 – Dynamics of mobile study user’s aggregate (normalized) restrictiveness 
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Figure 22 – Dynamics of laptop user’s aggregate (normalized) restrictiveness 
Users from the mobile study have a dynamic privacy policy pattern in which the time and 
location-based restrictiveness are rapidly applied (more than 90% is applied in the first 3 
days), while the group-based restrictiveness is applied in a more gradual fashion. 
Nonetheless, after the 3 days of Locaccino experience, users applied 75% (for all types of 
restrictions) of all the restrictiveness they will use in their privacy policies. 
The comparison of Figure 22 and Figure 23 reveals that laptop users are more prompt in 
applying their restrictiveness (more than 90% of all types of restrictiveness within the first 2 
days) than smartphone users. Smartphone users were required 16 days for applying similar 
amount of restrictiveness. 
 
Figure 23 - Dynamics of smartphone user’s aggregate (normalized) restrictiveness 
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The results of the dynamic analysis of the mobile users’ privacy policy management are 
resumed as follow: 
 Mobile users’ dynamic privacy policy restrictiveness pattern differs from the pattern 
observed for long-term users. The main difference consists in whether users apply more 
rapidly their group-based restrictiveness or their time and location-based restrictiveness. 
 Mobile users apply their time-based and location-based restrictiveness very rapidly 
(more than 90% within 3 days). 
 Smartphone users take more time than laptop users to define their privacy policies. This 
is even more relevant for group-based restrictions. 
Hypothesis for user privacy policy management behavior 
In this section we evaluate the feedback hypothesis, presented in section 3.1.7. We 
evaluate the hypothesis in regard to users who had access to feedback. Because we do 
not have users from the mobile study without feedback functionality, we are forced to 
use a transitive reasoning. After concluding that the feedback hypothesis holds with 
higher probability for (laptop) users with feedback functionality, we then compare 
laptop users to smartphone users. 
Interestingly, the probability of a privacy policy modification being connected to feedback is 
much higher for smartphone users (50% versus 7.7%). The value obtained for the whole 
population of the mobile study is consistent with the value obtained for the study of long-
term users. 
This analysis validates feedback as having an important role, not only in users’ privacy 
awareness, but also in users’ privacy policy management. Its importance is higher for 
smartphone users, whose privacy concerns are inherently higher. 
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5 Discussion 
The results of this project, composed by two studies, impact the design of user 
interfaces for location-sharing applications and also future research on the same topic. 
Additionally, they provide relevant insights for understanding the evolution of the 
location-sharing paradigm. 
5.1. Implications for design 
The results of this project may impact several aspects of the design of user interfaces in 
location-sharing applications: 
Privacy policy awareness 
This study revealed the importance of the feedback functionality for helping users 
defining their policies, which is particularly noticeable for the smartphone users.  
Complementary mechanisms for helping users evaluating the effectiveness of their 
privacy policies can also be implemented in the user interface. One such mechanism is 
the inclusion in the feedback of a reference to the rules that allow the disclosure of each 
location. Additionally, the interface should alert users of the rules that are never used 
and provide statistics about which rules are the most effective, friends that that request 
more locations, periods of the day, etc. 
Machine learning techniques 
The results of this study also revealed the user’s privacy policy modifications become 
more complex over time. Machine learning techniques for helping the users in the 
process of privacy policy management must take this observation into account, by 
providing suggestions with increasing level of complexity/richness. 
The dynamics of suggestions must also take into consideration that time-based 
restrictions are the most static, location-based restrictions tend to become more 
dynamic in the mobile scenario, and social-based restrictions have long-term dynamics. 
User interfaces for mobile devices 
Due to the inherent limitations of smartphone interfaces (e.g., reduced screen size), the 
prioritization of the functionalities is crucial for its selective inclusion in the user 
interface. 
The interface component that allows the users to modify the privacy policies must 
include the minimum necessary information for the definition of the restrictions. For the 
group-based restrictions, we suggest forms optimized for (3x3) nine elements, since the 
results of the study demonstrated that most group-based restrictions have eight 
elements.  
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A tailored version of the feedback functionality must be implemented in the 
smartphone versions of Locaccino, where the information of the requests locator must 
prevail over the temporal and geographic contextual information. 
5.2. Future work 
Data from both long-term and mobile studies revealed some weaknesses by containing 
scarce information for dynamic privacy policy analysis. While some of these weaknesses 
are user-intrinsic, workarounds can be found for some.  
In the user-intrinsic category, we find the generalized low level of usage of our location-
sharing application, which is particularly critical in terms of privacy policy management. 
The increment in the activity observed in users with mobile devices suggests that, 
aligned with the adoption of location technology by the mobile market, data available 
for research in the near future will be necessarily richer. 
We also found difficult to ensure with certainty, based on the existing data, that a given 
policy modification is related to an event, e.g., with the visualization of feedback. The 
existing auditing mechanisms are insufficient for this purpose because they are strongly 
dependent of the users, therefore, the logging of the user feedback visualizations should 
be collected as complement. 
It remains an open question whether the lack of popularity of location-based 
restrictions is due to usability issues or to the fact that users find it unnecessary. We 
suggest stronger metrics for the analysis of location-based restrictiveness, e.g., 
combining characteristics of the locations defined in the rules with the actual user’s 
location. Additionally, both smartphone and laptop users should be asked about this 
topic in a survey. 
In this study, users typically performed short-term privacy policy modifications that 
resulted into more open policies. We believe that this monotonic behavior will change 
with the user savviness and the penetration of smartphones. Nevertheless, users should 
be asked whether the stability and monotonic behavior of their policies is due to the 
fact that users perceive their policies as efficient, or due to other factors. 
5.3. Location-sharing evolution 
The generic activity of location-sharing users provides a good metric for evaluating 
user’s tradeoff between the location sharing benefits and the privacy concerns that 
these applications raise.  
Our results suggest that mobile devices bring enhanced activity to the location-sharing 
scene. Compared to laptop users, smartphone users produce more location requests, 
receive more requests and are more open in general. In other words, smartphone users 
are more active, their locations are more valuable to the location-sharing community, 
and they are more open to sharing. Note that the fact that smartphone users are more 
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open is beneficial for the generalized adoption of location-sharing by reducing the risk 
of users having their locations requests systematic denied.  
Mobile devices not only bring enhanced location-sharing activity but also raise 
additional privacy concerns to users. We believe that the impact of our results in the 
design of user interfaces result in significant enhancements in the way they address the 
privacy concerns that have been a barrier to the generalized adoption of location 
sharing applications. 
The combination of the enhanced user interfaces with the optimistic results from the 
comparative analysis of laptop and smartphone users’ activity, suggest that the critical 
mass of users’ activity required for users to fully understand the benefits of location-
sharing can be achieved in a near future. 
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6 Conclusions 
This project presents the findings of two studies, focusing on examining the dynamics of 
user privacy policy management in the context of location-sharing applications.  
A first set of results was based on a study of a long-term usage population of a live 
location-sharing application, in which participants shared their location with real friends 
and acquaintances. A second set of results was reached based on a four-week field 
investigation of the same location-sharing application in similar conditions. 
Our findings are the following: 
 Social-based restrictions dominate the users’ expressiveness spectrum. This type of 
restriction is also embedded of higher dynamics (compared to time-based and 
location-based restrictions), due to the inherent dynamics of social networks. 
 When modifying their privacy policies through time, users typically evolve to less 
restrictive policies. Modifications that produce more restrictive privacy policies are 
exceptions. 
 The privacy policies of users with higher number of iterations become more 
composite with each iteration, suggesting an increasing awareness of the 
implications of their decisions over time. 
 In the process of defining their privacy policies, smartphone users require more 
iterations and a longer convergence period than laptop users. This suggests a higher 
level of privacy concern in respect to their locations and a more demanding attitude 
with the effectiveness of their privacy policies. 
 Feedback mechanisms not only provide awareness but also influence the user’s 
privacy policy management process with considerable probability. This is more 
noticeable for smartphone users. 
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